Security and confidentiality on shared computational resources
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2026-06
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Zusammenfassung
The distinction between local and remote computing is increasingly blurred as
modern computation relies extensively on the use of shared resources. Pervasive
sharing of computational resources is evident in many use cases such as cloud
computing, where computational tasks are outsourced to remote servers. Addition-
ally, rented servers, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), and even web browsers often
rely on shared hardware infrastructure.
While the benefits of shared computing resources, such as scalability and cost-
effectiveness, are well-documented, this trend also introduces novel security risks.
The reliance on shared hardware infrastructure creates opportunities for unautho-
rized access, data breaches, and other malicious activities.
One very prominent example of sharing both hardware and data are machine
learning applications. The use of machine learning applications is rapidly increasing
in almost every part of our lives, which includes granting them access to highly
sensitive information like health or credit data. At the same time, the models that
are used grow larger and larger, necessitating substantial computational resources.
This surge in resource consumption has led to a rise in outsourcing both training
and inference processes, resulting in the processing of sensitive data on untrusted
machines. In this thesis, we examine how to protect data in distributed machine
learning systems. In particular, we look at outsourced computations on a machine
with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and a fast processing unit, such as a
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). I examined the SLALOM protocol, a seminal work
in privacy-preserving inference. In this theses I present a new method, CARNIVAL,
to significantly speed up the preprocessing phase. CARNIVAL leverages the pseudo-
randomness of the Subset sum problem to enable efficient outsourcing during the
preprocessing phase. The findings from the performance benchmarks demonstrate
that CARNIVAL is a promising candidate for real-world implementations. A second
possibility to continue working with the SLALOM framework, DASH, is introduced
briefly. It builds on arithmetic Garbled Circuits (GCs) in combination with a TEE.
Beschreibung
Schlagwörter
Security, Cache Attacks, Cryptology, Side-channel attacks
Zitierform
Institut/Klinik
Institut für IT-Sicherheit